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DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FOR SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE: A PROPOSAL FOR REDUCING
SENTENCING DISPARITIES AMONG
CODEFENDANTS
Antoinette Marie Tease*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United
States Sentencing Commission pursuant to the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, a defendant who cooperates with the government may
receive a sentence significantly less than a codefendant whose role
in the offense was minor. In many cases, the minor offender does
not possess the information the government seeks to conduct other
investigations or prosecutions. By virtue of his lesser culpability,
the minor offender is deprived of the opportunity to obtain a
downward departure based on assistance rendered to the govern-
ment. Thus, a major offender may receive a more lenient sentence
than a codefendant whose role in the offense was minor.' To illus-
trate, the kingpin of a drug conspiracy who cooperates with the
government could receive a sentence below the statutory mini-
mum, while a codefendant who acted solely as a drug courier could
receive a heavier sentence because his limited knowledge of the
conspiracy is less valuable to the government.
One of the aims of the Sentencing Guidelines is to narrow dis-
parities in sentencing.2 However, when one defendant cooperates
with the government and receives a lenient sentence, there is no
specific mechanism by which the sentencing court can reduce the
sentences of his codefendants so that the sentences are fair in rela-
tion to each other. Conversely, there is no provision limiting the
sentence received by the cooperating defendant to insure fairness
in the sentencing of codefendants.
Defendants who cooperate with the government should be re-
warded. However, they should not be rewarded to the extent that
they are given sentences lower than less culpable codefendants who
* B.A., Harvard University, 1987 (Cum Laude); J.D., University of Connecticut, 1990
(High Honors). Ms. Tease is an associate with Shearman & Sterling in New York and for-
mer clerk to United States District Judge David Alan Ezra.
1. As the Ninth Circuit recently acknowledged, "the Guidelines could yield the anom-
alous result of a defendant with a serious criminal history receiving a lower sentence than a
first time offender .... " United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 750 (9th Cir. 1991) (en
banc).
2. "Disparity was said to be one of the most important evils the guidelines were in-
tended to cure." United States v. Ray, 930 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1990).
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were unable to provide information to the government.3 The
Guidelines should include specific provisions which allow sentenc-
ing courts the discretion to alleviate such sentencing disparities.
The Discussion section of this article reviews the Sentencing
Guidelines in general and departures in particular, notes the vari-
ous grounds for departure, and examines the constitutionality of
the government motion requirement of section 5K1.1. The Discus-
sion section also addresses disparities in sentencing, with specific
emphasis on disparities generated by the substantial assistance
provisions.4 The Commentary sets forth proposals for providing
courts with the discretion to eliminate sentencing disparities when
a major offender cooperates with the government and receives a
lesser sentence than a minor offender who was unable to cooperate.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Sentencing Guidelines in General
The Sentencing Reform Act ("Act") took effect on November
1, 1987, as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.1
The Act created the United States Sentencing Commission
("USSC") as an independent body within the judicial branch and
gave it the authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines and pol-
icy statements.6 The USSC in turn promulgated the United States
Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). All defendants who commit
federal offenses after November 1, 1987, are sentenced under the
Guidelines.7
According to the drafters of the Guidelines, Congress had
three objectives in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
First, Congress sought to "enhance the ability of the criminal jus-
tice system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing
3. United States v. Nelson, 918 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1990). A different scenario would
be presented if the lesser offender was given the opportunity to assist the government and
refused. As the Sixth Circuit noted in United States v. Nelson, "[riewarding one who has
[been given the opportunity and] not cooperated with authorities to essentially the same
degree as those who have cooperated strains the incentives inherent in reward and punish-
ment." Id. at 1275.
4. "Substantial assistance provisions" refers to Guideline § 5K1.1 as well as 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). See infra notes 22 and 23.
5. 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
6. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1991).
7. See United States v. Woolford, 896 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Thomas, 895 F.2d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 1063, 1069 (3d Cir.
1989); United States v. Story, 891 F.2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Johnson,
889 F.2d 1032, 1036 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Newman, 889 F.2d 88, 94 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2566 (1990); United States v. Walker, 885 F.2d 1353, 1354
(8th Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 53
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 53 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/3
1992] SENTENCING GUIDELINES
system." s Second, Congress aimed to provide reasonable uniform-
ity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences im-
posed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offend-
ers." Third, "Congress sought proportionality in sentencing
through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences
for criminal conduct of differing severity.
10
Under the Guidelines, a defendant's sentence is calculated
through a combination of total offense level and criminal history
category. The total offense level is determined by beginning with
the base offense level for the particular offense and then adjusting
that base level upward or downward based on such factors as ac-
ceptance of responsibility, role in the offense, obstruction of jus-
tice, etc." The criminal history category is determined by assigning
"points" to each of the defendant's past offenses. 2 If a defendant
is considered a "career offender," he receives the highest criminal
history category.' 3
The combination of a defendant's total offense level and crim-
inal history category results in a "guideline range." A sentence
within the guideline range is not appealable absent a showing that
the guidelines were incorrectly applied or that the sentence was in
violation of law." If a judge chooses to depart from the guideline
range, however, the standard of review is more stringent.' 5 Discre-
8. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (hereinafter U.S.S.G.),
Part A-Introduction, at 1.2.
9. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988) (courts directed to impose sentences
considering need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct); United States v. Pearson, 911 F.2d
186, 190 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 352 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. White, 869 F.2d
822, 825 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989), and cert. denied sub nor.
Chambless v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 560 (1989).
10. U.S.S.G., Part A-Introduction, at 1.2.
11. See id. §§ 3A1.1-3E1.1.
12. See id. §§ 4A1.1-.3.
13. See id. §§ 4B1.1-.4.
14. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West Supp. 1991); United States v. Molinar-Apodaca, 889
F.2d 1417, 1424-25 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Soliman, 889 F.2d 441, 443 (2d Cir.
1989).
15. Several circuits employ a three-prong test in which the appellate court (1) evalu-
ates whether the circumstances relied upon by the district court in departing are sufficiently
"unusual" to warrant departure; (2) applies a clearly erroneous standard to determine
whether the circumstances relied upon by the sentencing judge actually existed; and (3)
assesses whether the degree of departure was reasonable. United States v. Martinez-Duran,
927 F.2d 453, 455-56 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Benskin, 926 F.2d 562, 564-65 (6th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Simmons, 924 F.2d 187, 191 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Williams, 922 F.2d 578, 581 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1637 (1991); United
States v. Dall, 918 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 981 (1991); United
States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1554 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 553 (1989);
3
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tionary refusals to depart are not appealable. 6 Nor can a defend-
ant appeal the degree of a downward departure." If a sentencing
court intends to depart from the guidelines, the defendant must be
given notice and an opportunity to be heard. 8
The constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act was up-
held by the United States Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United
States.9 In that case, the Court held that Congress did not violate
the separation of powers doctrine by delegating to the USSC the
authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines. The Court
reasoned:
[C]onsistent with the separation of powers, Congress may dele-
gate to the Judicial Branch nonadjudicatory functions that do not
trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch and that are ap-
propriate to the central mission of the Judiciary.20
The Guidelines have been challenged on various constitutional
grounds and upheld in every Circuit.2 '
United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 177
(1989); see also Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), petition for cert.
filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 2112 (U.S. July 22, 1991) (No. 88-5161) (five-step test previously utilized
by Ninth Circuit may be combined into three steps). When a departure is extreme, it must
be supported by clear and convincing evidence. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084,
1102 (3d Cir. 1990).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 921 F.2d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1044 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Soto, 918 F.2d 882, 884
(10th Cir. 1990); Schetz v. United States, 901 F.2d 85, 87 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 30-31 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 65 (1990); United States v. Wickstrom, 893 F.2d 30, 33
(3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Davis, 878 F.2d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 341 (1989). Cf. United States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 916, 918-19 (4th Cir. 1990); (all
holding that refusal to depart is reviewable only if district court believed it was without
authority to depart).
17. See United States v. Ybabez, 919 F.2d 508, 510 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2801 (1991); United States
v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Vizcarra-Angulo, 904 F.2d
22, 23 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gant, 902 F.2d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Wright, 895 F.2d 718, 722
(11th Cir. 1990).
18. United States v. Fortenbury, 917 F.2d 477, 480 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Rafferty, 911 F.2d 227, 230 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sands, 908 F.2d 304, 307 (8th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Cota-Guerrero, 907 F.2d 87, 90 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Landry, 903 F.2d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hedberg, 902 F.2d 1427, 1429
(9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 642, 644 (1st Cir. 1990); United States
v. Ramirez Acosta, 895 F.2d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nuno-Para, 877
F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1989).
19. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
20. Id. at 388.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 900 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990) (due process);
United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1990) (effective assistance of counsel);
United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 88 (1990)
4
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B. Departures
1. Grounds for Departure
The Guidelines set forth several specific grounds for both up-
ward and downward departures. In particular, a judge may grant
downward departure based on a defendant's substantial assistance
to the government. Section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines provides:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
of another person who has committed an offense, the court may
depart from the guidelines.
(a)The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for
reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, considera-
tion of the following:
(1)the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the
defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the govern-
ment's evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(2)the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any informa-
tion or testimony provided by the defendant;
(3)the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4)any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the de-
fendant or his family resulting from his assistance;
(5)the timeliness of the defendant's assistance."
The Application Notes to section 5K1.1 provide that substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense may justify a sentence below a stat-
utorily required minimum sentence under the circumstances set
(due process); United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 164 (1990) (separation of powers and due process); United States v. Barnerd, 887 F.2d
841 (8th Cir. 1989) (due process and presentment clause); United States v. Baker, 883 F.2d
13 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 517 (1989) (equal protection); United States v.
Erves, 880 F.2d 376 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Villarreal v. United States, 110
S. Ct. 416 (1989) and cert. denied sub nom. Richardson v. United States, 880 F.2d 376 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 416 (1989) (due process); United States v. Fernandez, 877
F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1989) (due process); United States v. Jacobs, 877 F.2d 460 (6th Cir. 1989)
(due process); United States v. Bolding, 876 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1989) (due process); United
States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1989) (due process); United States v. Seluk, 873 F.2d
15 (1st Cir. 1989) (separation of powers and due process); United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d
992 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1095, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989) (separation of powers).
22. U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1. While § 5K1.1 addresses downward departures at the time of
sentencing, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) authorizes a court to reduce a sen-
tence based on substantial assistance after sentencing. Rule 35(b) provides in part: "The
court, on motion of the Government, may within one year after the imposition of a sentence,
lower a sentence to reflect a defendant's subsequent, substantial assistance in the investiga-
tion or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, in accordance with the
guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section
994 of title 28, United States Code." FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
1992]
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forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n).2 3 A motion for
downward departure based on substantial assistance must be
brought by the government. 24
Other than substantial assistance to the government, the
Guidelines set forth four additional instances which warrant down-
ward departure. Specifically, the Guidelines authorize downward
departure if the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly
to provoking the offensive behavior.2 5 Downward departure is also
authorized if the defendant committed a crime in order to avoid a
perceived greater harm, for example, a mercy killing.2 6 Similarly, if
the defendant committed a crime under coercion, blackmail, or du-
ress, none of which constituted a complete defense, downward de-
parture is authorized. Finally, the Guidelines provide that if the
defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from
significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary
use of drugs or other intoxicants, a sentence below the guideline
range may be appropriate.2 8 A government motion is not a pre-
requisite for downward departure based on any of these grounds.
Various other sections of the Guidelines provide for upward
departures. Specifically, courts are authorized to depart upward
from the guideline range if death resulted; 29 if significant physical
23. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) provides in part:
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a
sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect
a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person who has committed an offense.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(e) (Supp. 1991). Title 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) provides:
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriate-
ness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a
sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to
take into account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or pros-
ecution of another person who has committed an offense.
28 U.S.C.A. § 994(n) (Supp. 1991).
24. United States v. Dumas, 934 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Chotas,
913 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 922 F.2d 849 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1421 (1991); United States v. Oransky, 908 F.2d 307, 309 (8th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Bruno, 897 F.2d 691, 696 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Alamin, 895 F.2d 1335,
1337 (11th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 914 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 710
(1991); United States v. Coleman, 895 F.2d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 1990). For a proposal that
defense counsel should be allowed to move for downward departure based on substantial
assistance, see Lee, The Sentencing Court's Discretion to Depart Downward in Recognition
of a Defendant's Substantial Assistance: A Proposal to Eliminate the Government Motion
Requirement, 23 IND. L. REv. 681 (1990).
25. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10.
26. Id. § 5K2.11.
27. Id. § 5K2.12.
28. Id. § 5K2.13.
29. Id. § 5K2.1. 6
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injury resulted;"° if the victim suffered extreme psychological in-
jury;3' if a person was abducted, taken hostage, or unlawfully re-
strained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate the
escape from the scene of the crime;3" if the offense caused property
damage or loss not taken into account within the guidelines; 3 if a
weapon or dangerous instrumentality was used or possessed in the
commission of the offense;3' if the defendant's conduct resulted in
a significant disruption of a governmental function;35 if the defend-
ant's conduct was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to
the victim;s if the defendant committed the offense in order to
facilitate or conceal the commission of another offense;37 if national
security, public health, or safety was significantly endangered;3 8 or
if the defendant committed the offense in furtherance of a terrorist
action." A defendant's refusal to cooperate with authorities may
not be grounds for upward departure. 0 A government motion is
not required for upward departure.
Section 5K2.0 acts as a catch-all provision for departures from
the guideline range." That section acknowledges that under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b) the sentencing court may depart from the guide-
line range if it finds "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that de-
scribed."' Where the applicable offense guideline and adjustments
have already taken into consideration a particular factor, that fac-
tor may not be a basis for departure unless it "is present to a de-
gree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in
30. Id. § 5K2.2.
31. Id. § 5K2.3.
32. Id. § 5K2.4.
33. Id. § 5K2.5.
34. Id. § 5K2.6.
35. Id. § 5K2.7.
36. Id. § 5K2.8.
37. Id. § 5K2.9.
38. Id. § 5K2.14.
39. Id. § 5K2.15.
40. Id. § 5K1.2.
41. The Commission intended to provide for two kinds of departure. The first "in-
volves instances in which the guidelines provide specific guidance for departure by analogy
or by other numerical or non-numerical suggestions." U.S.S.G. § 1A4(b), p.s., at 1.6. The
second type of departure is "unguided." Id. Such departures "may rest upon grounds re-
ferred to in Chapter Five, Part K (Departures), or on grounds not mentioned in the guide-
lines." Id.
42. Id. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
19921
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the offense.' ' 3
The court may also depart from the guideline range if it finds
that the defendant's criminal history category does not adequately
reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or
the likelihood that he will commit future crimes . Pursuant to this
section, a court may depart upward or downward. 5
2. Constitutionality of Section 5Kl.1 -Government Motion
Requirement
The constitutionality of the government motion requirement
of § 5K1.1 of the Guidelines, which provides for downward depar-
tures based on substantial assistance to the government, has been
challenged in several circuits. In United States v. Musser, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that the government mo-
tion requirement unconstitutionally delegated "to prosecutors un-
bridled discretion to decide who is entitled to a sentence reduc-
tion.""' The court noted that the only authority delegated to
prosecutors was the authority to move for a reduction of sentence;
authority to actually reduce a sentence remained with the court.47
The court further held that because the defendant did not have a
"constitutional right to the availability of a substantial assistance
provision," he had no grounds upon which to challenge Congress'
manner of enacting it.""
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Ayarza, expressly
adopted the Musser holding.49 In Ayarza, the court rejected sepa-
ration of powers and due process challenges to section 5K1.1.50 The
court noted that "it is rational for Congress to lodge some sentenc-
ing discretion in the prosecutor, the only individual who knows
whether a defendant's cooperation has been helpful." 51
Similarly, in United States v. Huerta, the Second Circuit held
that the requirement of a government motion did not constitute
43. Id.
44. Id. § 4A1.3.
45. See id.
46. 856 F.2d 1484, 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1145
(1989).
47. Id.; see also United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1016 (1st Cir. 1990).
48. Musser, 856 F.2d at 1487; see also United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 30, 33 (5th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Valencia, 913 F.2d 378, 386 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655, 657 (10th Cir. 1990); La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1015; United States v.
Lewis, 896 F.2d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Francois, 889 F.2d 1341, 1345 (4th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1822 (1990).
49. 874 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 847 (1990).
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1015.
[Vol. 53
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interference with or usurpation of a constitutionally assigned judi-
cial function in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.52
The court likewise held that the government motion requirement
did not violate due process, even though it circumscribed judicial
sentencing discretion 3 The court reasoned: "Like his separation of
powers argument, Huerta's due process claim rests on the faulty
premise that judicial sentencing discretion cannot be validly cir-
cumscribed." 4 The court further explained that: "[T]here is no
right to individualized sentencing, and Congress may constitution-
ally prescribe mandatory sentences or otherwise constrain the ex-
ercise of judicial discretion .... so long as such constraints have a
rational basis." 55
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United
States v. Grant,56 holding that "[d]ue process is not offended by a
guideline that narrows the discretion of a sentencing court." 7 The
court noted that: "[T]he motion requirement 'is predicated on the
reasonable assumption that the government is in the best position
to supply the court with an accurate report of the extent and effec-
tiveness of the defendant's assistance.' "58
The Seventh Circuit also rejected due process challenges to
the government motion requirement in United States v. Lewis5 9
In that case, the defendant argued that the government motion re-
quirement (1) improperly restricted the sentencing judge's tradi-
tional discretion,"0 (2) deprived him of his "right to present accu-
rate and reliable information to the trial court concerning his
substantial assistance,' '61 and (3) placed undue discretion with the
prosecutor.2
C. Disparities in Sentencing
1. Disparities Among Codefendants in General
Disparities in sentences alone do not violate the Sentencing
Reform Act.6 3 Equalization of codefendants' sentences is not re-
52. 878 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1989).
53. Id. at 93-94.
54. Id. at 94.
55. Id.
56. 886 F.2d 1513 (8th Cir. 1989).
57. Id. at 1514.
58. Id. (quoting White, 869 F.2d at 829).
59. 896 F.2d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1990).
60. Id. at 248.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. United States v. Sanchez Solis, 882 F.2d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1989).
19921
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quired under the Sentencing Guidelines." The mere fact that a co-
defendant has received a lighter sentence does not indicate an
abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing judge. 5 The argu-
ment that a defendant has received a harsher sentence than a co-
defendant is not a ground for relief on appeal."' In other words, "a
defendant cannot base a challenge to his sentence 'solely on the
lesser sentence given by the district court to his co-defendant.' "67
The mere fact that a sentencing judge perceives it as unjust
for a defendant to receive a lesser sentence than his codefendant is
not, by itself, a valid ground for upward departure. 68 Conversely,
the sole fact that co-conspirators have received lighter sentences
does not justify a downward departure. 9 In general, a district
court may not depart downward from the guideline range for the
sole purpose of harmonizing the defendant's sentence with that re-
ceived by his codefendant. 0 However, as discussed more thor-
oughly below, one court has held that where codefendants received
lighter sentences due to substantial assistance departures, a de-
fendant may be entitled to a downward departure in order to con-
form his sentence to those of his co-conspirators."
2. Disparities Generated by Substantial Assistance Provisions
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Nelson, held as a mat-
ter of law that a district court was not precluded from departing
downward in order to conform the defendant's sentence to those
received by his co-conspirators who had cooperated and received
substantial assistance departures. 2 In Nelson, the defendant's
64. United States v. Carpenter, 914 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1990).
65. United States v. Smith, 897 F.2d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Castro,
887 F.2d 988, 1001 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Boyd, 885 F.2d 246, 248 (5th Cir. 1989).
66. United States v. Cox, 921 F.2d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Harrison,
918 F.2d 469, 475 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669, 678 (5th Cir. 1990),
reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1990); but cf. Williams, 894 F.2d at 213 (district court
reversed for inconsistent application of guidelines among codefendants).
67. Pierce, 893 F.2d at 678 (quoting Boyd, 885 F.2d at 249).
68. United States v. McKenley, 895 F.2d 184, 187-88 (4th Cir. 1990); cf. United States
v. Sardin, 921 F.2d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir. 1990) (where court departed upward for each of
three codefendants, degree of upward departure in each case should have been equivalent).
69. United States v. Restrepo, 936 F.2d 661, 670-71 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Carr, 932 F.2d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Richardson, 901 F.2d 867, 869 (10th
Cir. 1990); but cf. United States v. Ray, 930 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1990) (Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld a downward departure in order to conform the defendant's sentence to those of
his codefendants who were sentenced during a temporary suspension of the Guidelines in
the Ninth Circuit).
70. United States v. Parker, 912 F.2d 156, 158 (6th Cir. 1990).
71. United States v. Nelson, 918 F.2d 1268, 1273 (6th Cir. 1990).
72. Id. This holding has since been overruled. See United States v. Gessa, 944 F.2d
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guideline range called for a term of imprisonment of twelve and
one-half years to fifteen and one-half years.73 His co-conspirators,
on the other hand, had cooperated with the government and re-
ceived sentences of sixty, forty-eight, and thirty months based on
substantial assistance departures.7 4 The court held that as a matter
of law district courts "are not precluded ... from departing from
the guidelines in order to generally conform one conspirator's sen-
tence to the sentences imposed on his co-conspirators. '75 In reach-
ing its ruling, the court noted:
Of all the purposes that induced Congress to enact the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act .... none was more compelling than Congress'
desire to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing or, stated oth-
erwise, to eliminate unreasonable disparity in sentencing.7
Quoting section 5K2.0 as authority, the court reasoned that a sig-
nificant disparity between the guideline range of the defendant
and the sentences actually received by his co-conspirators was a
mitigating factor not adequately taken into consideration by the
guidelines.7
Applying the three-prong test for review of sentencing depar-
tures,78 the Sixth Circuit held that the circumstances relied upon
by the trial court in departing were sufficiently "unusual" to justify
departure. 79 Next, the court determined that the district court did
not clearly err "in finding that the unusual circumstance relied
upon for the departure actually existed."80 However, applying the
third prong of the test, the appellate court concluded that the de-
gree of departure was unreasonable." The court's ruling turned on
"substantial factual differences between Nelson's case and his con-
federates."82 Significantly, the court noted that Nelson had been
afforded the opportunity to cooperate with the government and
refused."'
The Second Circuit recognized the Nelson holding in United
265, 270 (6th Cir. 1991) ("departure solely for the sake of conformity among co-defendants
is not authorized under the guidelines").
73. Nelson, 918 F. 2d at 1273.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1271.
77. Id. at 1272-73.
78. See supra note 15.
79. Nelson, 918 F.2d at 1271-73.
80. Id. at 1273.
81. Id. at 1273-75.
82. Id. at 1275.
83. Id.
19921
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States v. Joyner.4 The court noted:
Recently, the Sixth Circuit upheld a sentencing judge's authority
to depart downward to lessen differences among sentences of co-
defendants, but restricted the significance of its ruling by holding
that the circumstance justifying leniency for the co-defend-
ants-cooperation-did not apply to the defendant whose depar-
ture was challenged by the Government."5
Unlike the Sixth Circuit in Nelson, however, the district court in
Joyner departed downward from the defendant's guideline range
in order to increase the difference between the sentence imposed
on Joyner, whom the district court found to be a minor offender,
and those received by his codefendants.86 In this context, the ap-
pellate court held that the district court erred in relying on "dis-
parity" as a basis for departure.8 7
Nelson was also cited in United States v. Rutana for the pro-
position that "departure in order to achieve conformity among co-
defendants is not appropriate where there is a basis for dispar-
ity."8 8 In Rutana, the court reversed the sentencing court's down-
ward departure.89 Although the district court did not state that it
departed downward in order to conform Rutana's sentence to
those of his codefendants, Rutana made the argument on appeal
that his sentence should be affirmed because it was similar to the
sentences imposed on his codefendants.90 Finding that disparity
was warranted in this case, the appellate court remanded the case
for resentencing.'
3. Constitutionality of Section 5K1.1-Unavailability to Minor
Offenders
In the following two cases, defendants challenged the constitu-
tionality of the substantial assistance provisions on the ground
84. 924 F.2d 454, 460 (2d Cir. 1991).
85. Id. (emphasis in original).
86. Joyner's codefendants each had been sentenced to 90 months, and Joyner's guide-
line range was 63-78 months. Id. at 457.
87. Id. at 462. Joyner has subsequently been cited for the proposition that a court
may not depart downward in order to decrease disparity. See, e.g., Restrepo, 936 F.2d at
671; Carr, 932 F.2d at 73.
88. 932 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1991), citing Nelson, 918 F.2d at 1273.
89. Id. at 1158.
90. Id. at 1159.
91. Id. In particular, the court noted that Rutana pled guilty to a knowing violation of
the Clean Water Act, whereas his codefendants pled guilty to a negligent violation of the
statute. Id. In addition, Rutana's offense level was increased by two for his leadership role,
while both his codefendants received four-level decreases for their minor roles. Id.
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that they were unavailable to minor offenders who did not possess
sufficient knowledge to aid the government in other investigations
or prosecutions. In both cases, the courts rejected the argument
that this fact alone renders the substantial assistance provisions
unconstitutional.
In United States v. Musser,9 the defendant argued that the
substantial assistance provisions violated equal protection because
those of low culpability were without sufficient knowledge to avail
themselves of the benefits of these provisions.9 3 Concluding that
Congress had a rational basis for enacting the relevant statutes,
the court rejected the defendant's argument.94 The court noted
that there was no disparate treatment because all minor partici-
pants were treated similarly. 5
The defendant in United States v. Severich9" argued that the
substantial assistance provisions violated her substantive due pro-
cess rights because she was unable to avail herself of their benefits
due to her minor role in the offense. Applying a rational relation-
ship standard, the court rejected her arguments and upheld the
substantial assistance provisions as constitutional. The court held:
On balance, the liberty interests of defendant here must give way
to the anti-drug abuse strategies advanced by Congress. There ex-
ists a rational relationship between the goal of enhanced prosecu-
tion of drug traffickers and incentives offered those who cooperate
in their prosecution. This relationship is no less valid because de-
fendant, due to her low level of participation, was unable to im-
plicate a drug kingpin through her cooperation which, arguably
through no fault [of] hers, proved unfruitful.98
Although the courts in both Musser and Severich held that
the substantial assistance provisions passed constitutional muster,
these cases illustrate the fact that the substantial assistance provi-
sions are available only to those who possess sufficient knowledge
to cooperate with the government. Often, minor offenders are per-
fectly willing to cooperate but are unable to do so because they
lack sufficient knowledge.
92. 856 F.2d 1484 (l1th Cir. 1988).
93. Id. at 1486-87.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 676 F. Supp. 1209, (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1989).
97. Id. at 1213-14. Defendant argued that "the imposition of a minimum sentence in
her case is irrational and overly severe in view of her inability to render substantial assis-
tance, a position owing to her minor role in the trafficking scheme and not to any lack of her
effort to cooperate." Id.
98. Id. at 1214.
1992]
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III. COMMENTARY
As noted by the Second Circuit in United States v. Reina, 9 it
is "troubling" that minimally culpable offenders often do not have
the quantity or quality of information which the government seeks
in conducting other investigations or prosecutions.'"0 Often, their
more culpable codefendants will receive lighter sentences based on
cooperation with the government, while the minor offender is not
afforded the opportunity to cooperate because he or she does not
possess the knowledge sought. It seems, on the whole, that more
culpable offenders are ultimately rewarded for their more extensive
knowledge, while in comparison, minor offenders are penalized for
their lack of knowledge. Such results are fundamentally unfair.'1"
The problem is particularly pronounced in light of the statu-
tory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses. Thus, as noted
previously, the kingpin of a drug conspiracy who cooperates with
the government may receive a lighter sentence than one who
served as a mere drug courier and whose knowledge of the conspir-
acy was limited. Although cooperation with the government should
be encouraged, it should not effectively reward major criminal of-
fenders for the extent of their criminal involvement.
Two alternatives would provide solutions to this problem.
First, the Guidelines could expressly provide that a basis for down-
ward departure exists when a more culpable codefendant has coop-
erated with the government and received a sentence below that of
the less culpable defendant. Such cases should be limited to in-
stances where the minor defendant has not been afforded the op-
portunity to cooperate with the government. 02 Second, the Guide-
lines could limit departures based on substantial assistance to no
less than the sentences received by less culpable defendants who
were not in a position to cooperate with the government. Either
approach would ensure that in cases of substantial assistance, the
Guidelines were applied with fundamental fairness.10 3
99. 905 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1990).
100. Id. at 640.
101. Where a less culpable defendant has been given the opportunity to cooperate
with the government and has refused, no such fundamental unfairness exists. See supra
notes 3 and 83 and accompanying text.
102. The fundamental unfairness arises when a minor offender, although willing to
cooperate with the government, cannot because he does not possess the breadth of informa-
tion that his more culpable codefendants do. In such situations, if the more culpable code-
fendants receive substantial assistance departures, the minor offender who would have coop-
erated with the government should have his sentence reduced so that it is proportional to
those of his codefendants.
103. Both options should be available to the court because the order in which code-
fendants are sentenced varies. If the major offender is sentenced first, the first option should
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14
Montana Law Review, Vol. 53 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/3
1992] SENTENCING GUIDELINES 89
Proponents of the Guidelines as written may argue that in en-
acting the substantial assistance provisions, Congress intended to
encourage a race to the prosecutor's office among defendants who
wish to provide information and receive lower sentences. What
Congress may not have envisioned, however, is that certain defend-
ants cannot participate in this race because they lack sufficient
knowledge. It is not the mere fact that minor offenders cannot
avail themselves of the substantial assistance provisions that ren-
ders them fundamentally unfair104 but rather the sentencing dis-
parities generated when their more culpable codefendants can. 0
IV. CONCLUSION
Although section 5K2.0 has been interpreted as providing
courts with the authority to depart downward to reduce sentencing
disparities generated by the substantial assistance provisions, only
one circuit has upheld this interpretation. 100 Other courts have
held that, in general, sentencing disparities alone do not warrant
departure.1 0 7
Because section 5K2.0 does not specifically refer to a court's
authority to depart downward in order to reduce sentencing dis-
parities, courts may be reluctant to rely on it. And unless a court
indicates on the record that it believed it did not have the author-
ity to depart downward, decisions not to depart are unreview-
able.'0 8 Including specific provisions in the Guidelines which per-
mit downward departure in order to conform the sentences of
minor offenders to those of more culpable codefendants who re-
ceived substantial assistance departures would indicate to sentenc-
ing courts that such situations present valid bases for departure.
be available to the court. If the minor offender is sentenced first, the second option should
be available. The second option should also be available in cases where a motion for down-
ward departure is brought on behalf of the major offender after both he and the minor
offender have been sentenced. See supra note 22.
104. See, e.g., Musser, 856 F.2d at 1487; United States v. Severich, 676 F. Supp. 1209,
1214 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
105. Section 3B1.2 of the Guidelines provides that a defendant's offense level may be
decreased by 4 if he was a minimal participant, by 2 if he was a minor participant, or by 3 if
his role fell in between the two. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Thus, the Guidelines do take into account
a defendant's minor role per se. What the Guidelines do not take specifically into account,
however, are sentencing disparities generated among codefendants when minor offenders are
not afforded the opportunity to obtain substantial assistance departures because they lack
knowledge.
106. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 68-70, 87-88 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Note also the Second Circuit's com-
ment that the lawfulness of reliance on disparity as a ground for departure has rarely been
litigated. Joyner, 924 F.2d at 459-60.
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The fact that the substantial assistance provisions and the
Guidelines in general have been upheld as constitutional under a
rational relationship standard does not mean that they could not
be further tailored to better achieve the goals sought by Congress.
In enacting the substantial assistance provisions, Congress may
have intended to tolerate sentencing disparities generated when
some defendants are willing to cooperate and others refuse. How-
ever, there is no indication that Congress intended for minor of-
fenders who are willing but unable to cooperate with the govern-
ment to receive sentences which are harsh in comparison with
those of their cooperating codefendants. Incorporation of the pro-
posals outlined in this article would further Congress' goals of nar-
rowing sentencing disparities and of seeking proportionality in
sentencing.
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